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First and foremost, however, this is a case about a
young Jamaican woman who one day left her country,
for the very first time, in order to travel to another
Caribbean country and, having arrived there, found
herself in a situation from which, several months later,
according to Jamaican medical practitioners, she was
still suffering post-traumatic stress.1
I.

INTRODUCTION: HASSLE-FREE TRAVEL

Shanique Myrie, a twenty-two-year-old, left Jamaica on March
14, 2011, to visit a friend in Barbados.2 Upon arriving in Barbados, she
was denied entry, subjected to invasive body cavity searches, detained
overnight in “demeaning and unsanitary conditions” and deported the
next day.3 She was never allowed to enter Barbados or given a reason
why she was denied entry and subjected to insults and inhumane
treatment.4 Alleging violation of her right to freedom of movement
under the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, Ms. Myrie filed an
application at the Caribbean Court of Justice (“CCJ” or “Court”) just
over a year later.
Long before Ms. Myrie’s denial of entry, the right to freedom
of movement has been an aspirational goal in Caribbean regional
integration. In particular, the notion of “hassle[-]free travel” emerged
in the Report of the West Indian Commission (“WIC”) entitled “Time
for Action.”5 The report’s recommendation for implementing hasslefree travel enthusiastically embodied those hopeful objectives while
also invoking the practical impediments to Caribbean regional
integration. Thus, within the Caribbean Community (“CARICOM”) 6,

Myrie v. Barbados, [2013] CCJ 3 (OJ), ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 2.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
WEST INDIAN COMMISSION (“WIC”), TIME FOR ACTION 142 (1993)
6
The Caribbean Community (“CARICOM”) is a grouping of twenty
countries: fifteen Member States and five Associate Members. See CARICOM,
1
2
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intraregional freedom of movement lies at the heart of the challenges
to regional integration. In concept and function, the topic of free
movement of people exemplifies the complexities of fully
implementing Caribbean regional integration.7 As summarized in a
Green Paper by the Barbados Ministry of Labour and Immigration:
Hassle[-]free travel refers to the freedom of
CARICOM nationals to travel into a[n]d within the
jurisdiction of any member state without harassment
or the imposition of impediment. The notion of
hassle[-]free travel is intended to foster a greater sense
of community and to encourage greater intraCARICOM tourism.8
Several issues factor into the discussion of this topic within the
larger context of generating regional unity. First, the freedom of
movement issue emerged early in the regional integration process as
an impediment to regional cooperation. Second, the mechanism for
resolving these issues that could arise with this freedom was ultimately
established but required implementation. Third, the freedom of
movement issue, while political, is a highly personal and sensitive
concern that encapsulates the heart of CARICOM cooperation. Even
with these issues, regional integration in the Caribbean typically has
afforded hassle-free travel. Nonetheless, failing to uphold this goal in

Member States and Associate Members, https://caricom.org/member-states-andassociate-members/.
7
Mia Mottley, Prime Minister, Barbados, Address at the Opening Ceremony of the
39th Regular Meeting of the Heads of Government of CARICOM, CARICOM (July 6, 2018),
https://caricom.org/address-by-the-hon-mia-amor-mottley-q-c-m-p-primeminister-of-barbados-at-the-opening-ceremony-of-the-39th-regular-meeting-of-theheads-of-government-of-caricom/ (quoting a statement by Errol Barrow, the first
Prime Minister of Barbados, that “the regional integration movement is a fact of daily
experience. It is a reality which is lived but which we have not yet been able to
institutionalise.”).
8
Comprehensive Review of Immigration Policy and Proposals for Legislative Reform,
BARBADOS MINISTRY OF LABOUR & IMMIGRATION, 27 (2009),
https://barbadosunderground.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/green_paper_on_im
migration_policy.pdf .
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singular instances can have an enduring, sensational impact on the lives
of CARICOM citizens as illustrated in Myrie v. Barbados.9
As the Caribbean region has sought to consolidate the
hallmarks of regional cooperation, an ongoing political and
nationalistic battle has emerged between the aspirational language of
the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (“RTC”) 10 and the practical,
colonial imbued requirements of domestic law. In the midst of these
tensions are ongoing concerns about national security and crime
prevention within and among CARICOM nation states. These salient
issues came together in the original jurisdiction ruling of the CCJ in
Myrie v. Barbados.11 In this landmark case, the CCJ has revisited a key
issue of the freedom of movement as part of the Caribbean Single
Market and Economy (“CSME”). In remedying an essential question
concerning freedom of movement under the RTC, the CCJ also
addressed a potentially ruinous flaw12 in the CSME’s implementation.13
The Court, well aware of its role, stated:
Given the historic background of this aspect of free
movement, a background that can be found both in the
Myrie, supra note 1. Daniel Turack labeled the CARICOM approach as a
“qualified freedom of movement”. Daniel C. Turack, Freedom of Movement in the
Caribbean Community, 11 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 37, 42 (1981). He also stated,
“The freedom of establishment provisions of the CARICOM Treaty are purposely
weak and allow the prospective host country the necessary latitude to curtail any
significant influx of nationals from other CARICOM members.” Id. at 49.
10
In 2006, the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas replaced the original treaty
that was enacted in 1973. See AGREEMENT TO ENABLE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF
THE REVISED TREATY OF CHAGUARAMAS ESTABLISHING THE CARIBBEAN
COMMUNITY INCLUDING THE CARICOM SINGLE MARKET AND ECONOMY,
http://www.commonlii.org/caribbean/other/treaties/CaricomTSer/2006/5.pdf.
11
Myrie, supra note 1.
12
This flaw was noted in WEST INDIAN COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 135–
42 (1993). It has been called the “implementation gap.” See Derek O’Brien,
CARICOM: Regional Integration in a Post-Colonial World, 17 EUR. L.J. 630, 640–42
(2011).
13
CARICOM, CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME),
http://csme.caricom.org/. See also Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the
Caribbean Community including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy
(RTC),
arts.
1,
78,
Feb.
4.
2002,
2259
U.N.T.S.
293,
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/v2259.pdf.
9
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well-known report of the West Indian Commission,
Time For Action, and in several CARICOM reports,
Community nationals are entitled to assume that the
purpose of the 2007 Conference Decision is indeed “to
enhance their sense that they belong to, and can move
in, the Caribbean Community” and in the context of
the relevant provisions of the RTC set out in the
Annex to this judgment, the full extent of the right is
that both entry and stay of a Community national in
another Member State must not only be “definite” but
also “hassle[-]free” or “without harassment or the
imposition of impediments”. These are essential
elements of the right.14
Addressing the free movement of persons has revived a key
integration issue that frustrated the establishment of the West Indies
Federation and also presented the CCJ with a problematic
steppingstone in the Caribbean regional integration process. As a
Caribbean Policy Development Centre Paper observed “[t]he
importance of free movement to the CSME project is heavily rooted
in an understanding of what a Single Market is and what components
are necessary for it to function effectively.” 15 This paper also explained
that:
In the wider context, freedom of movement is
associated with the right of members of a “formal”
regional community (such as CARICOM) to settle and
work in any member state of that community. In the
Caribbean context, however, the term “freedom of
movement” has been associated with the less
ambitious objective that is commonly referred to as
“hassle[-]free travel.”16

Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 63.
Peter W. Wickham et al., Freedom of Movement: The Cornerstone of the Caribbean
Single Market and Economy (CSME), CARIBBEAN POL’Y DEV. CTR. 15 (2004)
(explaining the development of freedom of movement within CARICOM from 1989
to 2004).
16
Id. at 18.
14
15
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Even with this association, much of the discussion on freedom
of movement within CARICOM has focused primarily on achieving
freedom of movement for skilled workers within the CSME, while the
basic issue of hassle-free travel has taken a secondary position. As with
many aspects of the CSME framework, the creation of freedom of
movement mechanisms based on regional, or supranational law
remains problematic due to the perceived infringement on the
domestic sovereignty of CARICOM nations. Moreover, the ability of
the CCJ17 to resolve these issues by interpreting and proclaiming
regional law allows for the CCJ’s implementation of the RTC.
However, those powers also place the CCJ in the crosshairs of legal
debates that impact notions of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Further, while the resolution of these issues further advances the
RTC’s goals, the fallout from ongoing tensions can be highly
problematic for the expansion of the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction in the
region.
Since its publication in 2013, Myrie v. Barbados has become the
seminal case for hassle-free freedom of movement in the
Commonwealth Caribbean.18 This case is highly significant because it
considers the question of freedom of movement within the larger
context of regional integration. In so doing, it exposes the complexities
of operationalizing the CSME while overcoming the legal and historic
insular barriers to regional integration. At the regional level, the Myrie
ruling obviates the need for nations to conform their national travel
and immigration laws to the RTC. Rather than requiring the
implementation of national legislation, the CCJ’s decision
operationalized Article 45 of the RTC by using the treaty’s own
mechanisms. The key to implementing regional law was the CCJ’s
reliance on the 2007 Heads of Government Conference Decision
concerning the implementation of Article 45. Creating a legal
framework for freedom of movement for CARICOM nationals is
more difficult when the reason for movement is other than the
employment of skilled labor. Like the CSME framework for
establishing work permits, a cooperative strategy for establishing
Under Article 211 of the RTC, the Caribbean Court of Justice has
“compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes concerning
the interpretation and application” of the RTC. RTC, supra note 13, art. 211.
18
Myrie, supra note 1.
17
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hassle-free travel serves to fortify the economic alliances of the CSME.
Yet, the political impediments to establishing hassle-free travel have
also hindered regional economic integration.19 Thus, at a crucial
juncture in operationalizing the CSME, the CCJ employed its original
jurisdiction authority to implement the hassle-free travel provisions of
the RTC.
This article explores the development of the right of freedom
of movement in two main parts. First, it examines the history of
freedom of movement within the context of regional integration
starting with the West Indies Federation. Second, the article
extensively examines the Myrie v. Barbados case to explore how the CCJ
has interpreted Community law to implement hassle-free travel within
CARICOM. In so doing, this paper studies the evolution and
implementation of the right of freedom of movement in CARICOM.
II. REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN
AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN
Understanding the particular historical importance of the Myrie
v. Barbados case requires an overview of the progression of freedom of
movement within the Commonwealth Caribbean. Through the
evolution of the West Indies Federation into the CSME of
CARICOM, the advancement of freedom of movement provides
insights into the Commonwealth Caribbean’s colonial and postcolonial tensions in establishing sovereign nations while structuring
regional treaties and institutions. These historical developments
highlight the political and practical complications of a unified regional
approach to freedom of movement.
More importantly, the evolution of freedom of movement
shows an interplay between several interrelated features of the
Commonwealth Caribbean for two important reasons. First, British
imperialism initiated the integration of the region based on colonial
administrative exigencies rather than regional political selfgovernance.20 Second, the creation of this framework within the failed
19
20

See O’ Brien, supra note 12, at 632.
Id.
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West Indies Federation provides the historic backdrop for the ongoing
tensions attendant to the development of a contemporary regional
freedom of movement policy.
A. Freedom of Movement in the Failed West Indies Federation
The emergent conceptualization of freedom of movement was
incorporated into the creation, or perhaps more accurately imposition,
of the West Indies Federation (“WIF” or “Federation”)21. From its
onset the organization of the WIF was an attempt by Great Britain to
organize the West Indies into a federated unit for the purpose of
repackaging its colonial rule into a regional conglomerate.22 The
purpose of the union was to ease regional administration, but this
attempted fusion ultimately spurred national independence
movements in the region due to Great Britain’s attempt to create a
revamped colonial structure adopted from the Australian and United
States models.23 This restructuring was particularly ill-timed in that it
coincided with the coalescing of independence yearnings in the region,
and indeed throughout much of the British Empire. 24 Thus, in the
wake of World War II when colonial nations were calling for
independence, this reorganization of the British Caribbean naturally
encountered obstacles.25
Prior to the establishment of the WIF, the 1948-49 Report of
the British Caribbean Standing Closer Association Committee
(“SCAC”)26 incorporated freedom of movement into its list of
21
Elisabeth Wallace, The West Indies Federation: Decline and Fall, 17 INT’L J.
269, 270 (1962).
22
See O’ Brien, supra note 12, at 631–32.
23
Charles H. Archibald, The Failure of the West Indies Federation, 18 THE
WORLD TODAY 233, 238 (June 1962).
24
O’ Brien, supra note 12, at 635.
25
Salvatore Caserta & Mikael Rask Madsen, Between Community Law and
Common Law: The Rise of the Caribbean Court of Justice at the Intersection of Regional Integration
and Post-Colonial Legacies, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 90 (2016).
26
The SCAC was established after the Montego Bay Conference of 1947.
The SCAC’s establishment received the approval of British West Indian colonial
legislatures and consisted of “17 representatives of those legislatures under the
chairmanship of Sir Hubert Rance.” British Information Services, The British Colonial
Empire
in
1948
(1949)
at
8,
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proposed legislative powers for the Federation.27 According to the
Report, matters subject to concurrent legislation of the Federation and
the constituent territories included “[i]mmigration, emigration and
deportation” and “[m]ovements of persons, alien and other” between
the territories.28 These subjects were placed under concurrent
legislative powers because Federal law would consequently prevail over
inconsistent law in the constituent territories. With this concurrent
designation, “there [could] be no room for variation” in those subjects
“which are essential to the existence of the Federation.”29 By its
inclusion in the concurrent legislative list in two categories, “freedom
of movement was treated not so much as a perquisite of Federation
but rather as a prerequisite.”30
At the same time, however, the SCAC recognized that “in
some circles there is a demand for full independence, or for selfgovernment, either in advance of or simultaneously with Federation,
on the basis of existing political units.” 31 The SCAC opined,
nonetheless, that “the sheer force of circumstances of the modern
world makes independence on a unit basis a mirage.” 32 The SCAC
further clarified that its rationale for this conclusion was not a
“reflection on the political capacity, or the public spirit, of the peoples
of the territories.”33 Rather, the report explained that real political
independence requires financial stability.34 Accordingly, the report
asserted that “Federation, and only Federation, affords a reasonable

https://books.google.com/books?id=bhkuAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq
=British+Information+Services,+The+British+Colonial+Empire+in+1948+(194
9)&hl=en&newbks=1&newbks_redir=1&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwigvb7EhpbrAhU
SQ60KHV86BLYQ6AEwAHoECAQQAg.
27
British Caribbean Standing Closer Association Committee (SCAC),
Report, 1948-49, Col. 255, at 79–80 (UK). The Report included lists of suggested
exclusive and concurrent legislation.
28
Id. at 80.
29
Id. at 17, 79.
30
K. W. Patchett, English Law in the West Indies: A Conference Report, 12 INT’L
& COMP. L.Q. 922, 957 (1963).
31
SCAC, supra note 27, at 11.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 12–14.
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prospect of achieving economic stability” and through the Federation,
“that political independence . . . is our constant object[ive].”35
However, the WIF’s incorporation of freedom of movement
posed apparent threats to economic stability. As a result, “[t]he
Conference on Freedom of Movement was called in order to help
resolve the difficulties that had arisen in 1953 over the control of
migration.”36 In particular, Trinidad observed that “the immediate
granting of freedom of movement would in the existing economic
circumstances lead to a flood of immigrants swamping the island’s
prosperity.”37 At the same time, Trinidad recognized that it was illogical
to envision a federation with barriers to movement.38 Thus, it proposed
a delay before eliminating all barriers to movement. 39 As the Prime
Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Dr. Eric Williams, later explained:
The issue of freedom of movement involved the largescale migration to Trinidad from the smaller islands,
frequently illegal. It was sought to link freedom of
movement of persons with freedom of movement of
goods. Britain’s approval of the secession of British
Guiana, which was theoretically a refuge for the
redundant population of the smaller islands, and the
suspicion that Britain was beginning to find Caribbean

Id. at 14.
Lloyd Braithwaite, Progress Toward Federation, 1938—1956, 6 SOC. & ECON.
STUD. 133, 155 (June 1957). One catalyst for the Conference on Freedom of
Movement was the disagreement over the Federation’s legislative powers expressed
by the Trinidad and Tobago delegates at the Federation’s Conference held in London
in April of 1953. During the 1953 conference, the legislative authority for freedom
of movement between Federation territories was moved from the Federation’s
Concurrent Legislative List to its Exclusive Legislative List subject to certain
limitations for health, security, and economic concerns. See Colonial Office, infra note
41, at 1.
37
Charles H. Archibald, The Failure of the West Indies Federation, 18 THE
WORLD TODAY 233, 238 (June 1962).
38
Id.
39
Id.
35
36
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migrants unwelcome, made the issue a very sensitive
one in Trinidad and Tobago.40
The Conference on Freedom of Movement unanimously
adopted four resolutions regarding the Federation’s legislative
authority on free movement of persons.41 The first resolution stated
that the Preamble to the Federal Constitution should reference the
objective of the Federation to achieve “the greatest possible freedom
of movement for persons and goods within such Federation.”42
Nevertheless in response to Trinidad and Tobago’s concerns, Chapter
III of the 1958 Federal Constitution deferred the implementation of
freedom of movement of persons with the Federation “until five years
after the establishment of the Federation.”43
Three articles in Chapter III delayed implementation of the
Federation’s mechanisms for the freedom of movement of persons
between Federation territories.44 Collectively, these provisions sought
to sunset any Federation territory’s laws concerning freedom of
movement that were not repealed five years following the coming into
force of the Federation’s Constitution, or enacted after that five-year
period. First, article 49 excluded from the requirements for the
freedom of movement of persons any law related to maintaining public
health or public security in a Federation territory.45 Second, article 50
Eric Williams, A New Federation for the Commonwealth Caribbean, 44 POL. Q
242, 247 (Jul. -Sept. 1973).
41
Colonial Office, Report of the Conference on Movement of Persons
within a British Caribbean Federation, 1955, Colonial No. 315, at 2–3 (UK). The
Conference unanimously adopted a total of six resolutions. The first four resolutions
focused on freedom of movement within the Federation. In particular, the second
through fourth resolutions removed control over movement of persons within the
Federation from the Federation’s Exclusive Legislative List and placed that authority
over interterritorial movement on the Federation’s Concurrent Legislative List.
However, the Federation’s Exclusive Legislative List preserved control over
immigration into, and emigration and deportation from the Federation itself.
42
Id. at 1.
43
Williams, supra note 40 at, 247.
44
West Indies (Federation) Order in Council, 1957, SI 1957 No. 1364. This
order was authorized by the passage of the British Caribbean Federation Act, 1956.
The West Indies (Federation) Order in Council, 1957 included an annex with the
WIF Constitution.
45
Id.
40
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provided for a review and a repeal of any law controlling movement of
persons after a five-year period. Finally, article 51 prevented any new
laws enacted from coming into effect after the five-year period if those
new laws concerned movement of persons.46 These laws could be
saved from repeal or allowed to come into force if the Federal
legislature expressed its lack of objection to any such law within the
prescribed time frames.47 In short, the repeal of laws that controlled
the movement of persons between Federation territories was selfexecuting in that the Federal legislature only needed to act to preserve
laws controlling movement of persons that did not fall within the
article 49 exceptions. Through this repeal mechanism, Chapter III of
the Federation Constitution endeavored to fulfill the Constitution’s
objective to establish “the greatest possible freedom of movement of
persons” within the Federation.48
Apart from Chapter III, the Third Schedule of the 1958
Constitution included in the Federation’s Exclusive Legislative List
“[i]mmigration into, and emigration and deportation from, the
Federation.”49 This provision gave the Federation sole authority to
legislate on free movement of persons into or out of the Federation
while Chapter III would effectively prohibit the individual Federation
states from passing immigration laws affecting movement between
Federation territories after the expiration of the five-year period in
article 50. As one author noted, however, the repeal procedure of
article 50 “was never invoked nor did the Federal legislature find time
to pass movement legislation on interterritorial movement” and
similarly, “the Federal legislature never exercised this exclusive power”
to legislate on this subject.50

Id.
Id. For laws in force at the end of five years, the Federal legislature had
ninety days to express its lack of objection. For laws enacted after the five-year
period, the Federal legislature had sixty days to express its lack of objection to permit
the law to come into force.
48
Id.
49
Id. at art. 116 (1), The Third Schedule. The Exclusive Legislation List
meant that only the Federal legislature, and not the territorial legislatures, could act
on these matters.
50
Patchett, supra note 30, at 959.
46
47
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After the inauguration of the Federation in 1958 and with the
advent of independence, the West Indies Constitutional Conference in
1961 revised the freedom of movement provisions in the Federation’s
Constitution. The revised provisions placed interterritorial movement
of persons within the Federal Government’s exclusive legislative
power subject to certain limitations for a nine-year period.51 Within
that time frame, the Federal Government could only exercise its
“exclusive” power with the concurrence of the individual Federation
states.52 Moreover, the individual territories in the Federation could not
legislate increases of or expansions in migration control without the
Federal Government’s consent.53 However, the operation of these
provisions was problematic due to their ambiguity:
It is not clear whether the Federal power was to be
subject to concurrence at each exercise or whether the
exclusive power was to be freely exercisable after all
governments had agreed. Whichever view is taken, it is
apparent that ground was again given to those who
feared the consequences of loosened controls.54
Ultimately, the WIF dissolved soon after the withdrawal of
Jamaica and then Trinidad and Tobago. Jamaica, the largest nation in
the WIF, took two important steps that ultimately resulted in its
withdrawal from the WIF.55 First, a Jamaican delegation in London
learned from the Colonial Secretary that Jamaica could achieve
dominion status without the Federation.56 Second, in May 1960, the
51
Report of the West Indies Constitutional Conference, W. I. GAZETTE 5 (June 29,
1961), https://ufdc.ufl.edu//UF00076857/00200. While Eric Williams of Trinidad
and Tobago indicated that this nine-year period coincided with the establishment of
a customs union favored by Jamaica, Norman Manley of Jamaica expressed
displeasure with connecting free movement of people and free movement of goods.
Overand R. Padmore, Federation: The Demise of an Idea, 48 SOC. & ECON. STUD. 21, 55
(Dec. 1999).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Patchett, supra note 30, at 959.
55
Hugh W. Springer, Federation in the Caribbean: An Attempt that Failed, in THE
AFTERMATH OF SOVEREIGNTY: WEST INDIAN PERSPECTIVES 188, 202–3 (David
Lowenthal & Lambros Comitas eds., 1973).
56
Id. at 203.
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Jamaican government resolved to hold a national referendum on
whether Jamaica should remain in the WIF.57 The referendum to
remain in the WIF failed by a vote of forty-six percent in favor of
remaining to fifty-four percent against continued membership in the
WIF.58 This failed national referendum resulted in Jamaica’s
withdrawal even though its Premier, Norman Manley, was once an
outspoken supporter of the WIF.59
With Jamaica’s departure, Trinidad and Tobago became the
largest remaining member in the Federation. As shown in its position
on freedom of movement, Trinidad and Tobago was concerned that
its continuing membership in the WIF would result in Trinidad and
Tobago “bear[ing] the cost of funding the WIF or supporting the
poorer eastern Caribbean islands.” 60 Before withdrawing, however,
Trinidad and Tobago offered the remaining other eight nations an
option to join Trinidad and Tobago as a unitary state.61 Instead, the
remaining eight nations contacted the Colonial Secretary to state their
intention to form a new federation.62 After the WIF dissolved on May
31, 1962, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago achieved independence in
August 1962.63
B. RTC & CSME: The Regional Integration Development and
Freedom of Movement
Shortly after the WIF’s collapse, the Commonwealth
Caribbean nations embarked on several regional ventures, with each
arrangement progressively advancing regional integration. Borrowing
Id. at 202.
Id. at 204.
59
O’ Brien, supra note 12, at 634.
60
Id. at 635.
61
Charles H. Archibald, The Failure of the West Indies Federation, 18 THE
WORLD TODAY 233, 234 (June 1962).
62
It was not until 1981 that seven of these remaining eight nations formed
the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. See Dr. C.L. Mitchell, Economic
Affairs Secretariat, OECS, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF OECS ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION OVER THE PAST 10 YEARS (1992), https://www.oecs.org/en/ourwork/knowledge/library/oecs-economic-union/historical-perspective-of-oecseconomic-integration-over-the-past-10-years-july-1992-6398bopt-pdf.
63
O’ Brien, supra note 12, at 635.
57
58

550

2020

Hassle-Free Travel

8:2

heavily from the 1960 European Free Trade Agreement, the first treaty
for the Caribbean Free Trade Association (“CARIFTA”) was signed
in December 1965.64 Before this agreement was implemented, the
Fourth Conferences of the Heads of Government of the
Commonwealth Caribbean agreed that “Free Trade should be
introduced with respect to all intra-Commonwealth Caribbean trade
by 1st May, 1968.”65 Based on this pronouncement, a second
CARIFTA treaty was signed and came into effect in 1968. 66
CARIFTA created the institutional steppingstone for
CARICOM and later, for the formation of the Caribbean Single
Market and Economy. In 1972, the Heads of Government Conference
of Commonwealth Caribbean Countries agreed to transform
CARIFTA on its fifth anniversary into CARICOM.67 The Treaty of
Chaguaramas that established CARICOM came into effect on July 4,
1973.
Article 38 of the Treaty of Chaguaramas, however, specifically
excluded from its ambit the free movement of persons within
64
The Dickenson Bay Agreement was signed on December 15, 1965, by the
Heads of Government of Antigua, Barbados and British Guiana. Richard L. Abbott,
The Caribbean Free Trade Association, 1 LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS 1 (June 1969).
65
Summary of Conclusions of the Fourth Conference of Heads of
Government of Commonwealth Caribbean Countries, 23-27 October 1967,
Bridgetown, Barbados, https://caricom.org/summary-of-conclusions-of-thefourth-conference-of-heads-of-government-of-commonwealth-caribbeancountries-23-27-october-1967-bridgetown-barbados/.
66
The second treaty was first signed on May 1, 1968, by the three signatories
to the first treaty plus Trinidad and Tobago. On July 1, 1968, the following Windward
and Leeward islands joined: Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. On August 1, 1968, Jamaica and Montserrat
entered the agreement. Abbott, supra note 64, at 1.
67
”The Seventh Heads of Government Conference of Commonwealth
Caribbean Countries has agreed that the Caribbean Free Trade Association
(CARIFTA) will become a Common Market on 1st May, 1973, the fifth Anniversary
of CARIFTA.” Communiqué Issued at the Conclusion of the Seventh Heads of
Government Conference of Commonwealth Caribbean Countries, 9-14 October
1972, Chaguaramas, Trinidad and Tobago, https://caricom.org/communiqueissued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-seventh-heads-of-government-conference-ofcommonwealth-caribbean-countries-9-14-october-1972-chaguaramas-trinidad-andtobago/.
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CARICOM.68 A paper written for the Caribbean Policy Development
Centre noted that “[t]his article in the CARICOM Treaty (1973)
effectively set aside initiatives towards greater freedom of movement
and during this period Caribbean islands only maintained limited
‘informal’ mechanisms to allow the movement of employees of
regional institutions such as the UWI and Meteorological Service as
well as Lawyers.”69 Entitled “Saving in Respect of Movement of
Persons”, article 38 provided “[n]othing in this Treaty shall be
construed as requiring, or imposing any obligation on, a Member State
to grant freedom of movement to persons into its territory whether or
not such persons are nationals of other Member States of the Common
Market.”70
The next major step in regional integration, the creation of the
Caribbean Single Market and Economy, was announced in the Grand
Anse Declaration of 1989. 71 The Declaration provided, among the
Common Market objectives, the goal of creating “arrangements by
January 1991 for the free movement of skilled and professional
personnel as well as for contract workers on a seasonal or project
basis.”72 In this declaration, the CARICOM Heads of Government
also agreed to create the “Independent West Indian Commission for
Advancing the Goals of the Treaty of Chaguaramas.”73

68
Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community (TOC), art. 38, July 4, 1973,
946
U.N.T.S.
18,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20946/volume-946-I13489-English.pdf.
69
WICKHAM ET AL., supra note 15, at 9.
70
TOC, supra note 68.
71
Grand Anse Declaration and Work Programme for the Advancement of
the Integration Movement (Grand Anse Declaration), July 1989, Grand Anse,
Grenada, https://caricom.org/grand-anse-declaration-and-work-programme-forthe-advancement-of-the-integration-movement-july-1989-grand-anse-grenada/.
72
Id.
73
Id. Annex II contained a resolution that provided “that no later than 1
October 1989, the Commission be established as an Independent West Indian
Commission for Advancing the Goals of the Treaty of Chaguaramas and report to
Heads of Government prior to their meeting in 1992” and named Sir Shridath
Ramphal, as the chairman of the commission.
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Following the declaration, the WIC Report, published in 1992,
dedicated a portion of its discussion to “Ease of Travel and Freedom
of Movement.”74 Based on a Progress Report from the WIC, the Heads
of Government at their July 1991 meeting agreed “to the immediate
commencement of efforts to advance action by the Community” in six
areas recommended by the WIC.75 The first two areas identified for
action were (1) “[t]ravelling in the [r]egion” and (2) “[f]ree [m]ovement
of skilled persons.”76 In so doing, the WIC created a bifurcation of the
freedom of movement concept within CARICOM.
This noted partition of freedom of movement into two
components – one for tourists and visitors and the other for skilled
laborers was an important, yet problematic evolutionary step for
freedom of movement in the region. The summary of the Progress
Report explained that the first recommendation would “[p]ermit West
Indians to travel in their Region with the freedom and ease due to them
as citizens of a nation common to all [sic] and encourage exchange
visits, especially among young people.”77 Similarly, the second
recommendation on skilled labor would “[a]llow West Indian
graduates of UWI (and other institutions to be identified) and media
people to work and live freely anywhere in the Region as a first step to
permitting the free movement of skilled people within the Region.” 78
Article 45 of the RTC states that “Member States commit
themselves to the goal of freedom of movement of their nationals
within the Community.”79 By its wording, this provision appears to be
aspirational rather than binding.80 This wording, however, reflects the
sentiment of the WIC, which noted that free movement of persons,
though aspirational, was integral to deepening regional integration.81
WIC, supra note 5, at 133–42.
Communiqué Issued at the Conclusion of the Twelfth Meeting of the
Conference of Heads of Government, 2-4 July 1991, Basseterre, St. Kitts and Nevis,
https://caricom.org/communique-issued-at-the-conclusion-of-the-twelfthmeeting-of-the-conference-of-heads-of-government/.
76
Grand Anse Declaration, supra note 71.
77
WIC, supra note 5, at 14.
78
Id.
79
RTC, supra note 13, art. 45.
80
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 58.
81
WIC, supra note 5, at 141.
74
75
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For those reasons, the report recommended “the earliest
implementation” of mechanisms to ensure “‘hassle[-]free’ travel for
West Indians within the Region.”82 Thus, while noting the need for
freedom of movement, the WIC also perceived that there was an
implementation gap for ensuring this freedom.83 Accordingly, the
report concluded that the implementation of its recommendations on
freedom of movement would be “an essential pillar for the
establishment of the Single Market and Economy.”84 Yet, the report
recognized the practical difficulties of achieving hassle-free travel
stating:
Commissions, even Heads of Government, may
propose but civil servants in the end dispose. This is a
universal truth which the existing decision-making
machinery in CARICOM does not fully accommodate.
An imperial ukase to introduce hassle-free travel, for
instance, will not yield results at the Immigration and
Customs barriers unless the employees of Immigration
and Customs departments from top to bottom are not
only instructed, but are enlisted in the cause over a
sustained period of time. We are convinced that this is
a fundamental truth which will have applications to
every single recommendation we make in this Report.85
III. MYRIE V. BARBADOS – A CASE ILLUSTRATING THE ANTITHESIS
OF HASSLE-FREE TRAVEL
This discerning observation by the WIC seems to presage the
case of Myrie v. Barbados.86 After Ms. Myrie’s filing of the initial
application on May 17, 2012, the extensive proceedings for this case
took place over a year and a half and ended with the Court’s decision
on October 4, 2013.87 As a preliminary matter, the Court granted leave

82
83
84
85
86
87

WIC, supra note 5, at 142.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 15–16.
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 1.
Id.
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to establish its jurisdiction in hearing this case.88 After settling the
matter of its original jurisdiction to interpret the RTC, the Court
functioned as a trial court in hearing the case.89 Accordingly, the Court
convened several case management conferences, received numerous
written submissions, held public hearings and visited Grantley Adams
International Airport (“GAIA”) in Barbados.90
The primary issue in this case dealt with the freedom of
movement within the Caribbean Community.91 Unfortunately, the
facts of this case horrifically illustrate the antithesis of hassle-free
intraregional travel. As noted at the beginning of this article, the Court
sympathetically explained:
First and foremost, however, this is a case about a
young Jamaican woman who one day left her country,
for the very first time, in order to travel to another
Caribbean country and, having arrived there, found
herself in a situation from which, several months later,
according to Jamaican medical practitioners, she was
still suffering post-traumatic stress.92
Fourteen months after Ms. Myrie was denied entry to
Barbados, her lawyer filed an application in the Court that also
permitted the State of Jamaica to intervene. As the Court summarized:
Ms. Myrie instituted these proceedings against the State
of Barbados, the Defendant. She claims a right to free
movement within the Caribbean Community. She also
claims that the treatment to which she was subjected
by border officials in Barbados amounts to a serious
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 7.
Id.
90
Id. The opening paragraph of the decision lists the extensive proceedings
of the Court. There were four case management conferences, including the
preliminary one, two pre-hearing reviews, and nine days of public hearings.
Moreover, the decision listed thirteen attorneys of record—two for the Claimant,
Ms. Myrie, five for the Defendant, Barbados, three for the Intervener, Jamaica, and
three for CARICOM.
91
Id. at ¶ 1.
92
Id.
88
89
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violation of this right. She characterises the body cavity
search as an assault, a rape, of such a serious character
that it constitutes a violation of her fundamental
human rights and freedoms for which the State of
Barbados must be held accountable. Ms. Myrie further
submits that she was singled out and treated in the way
that she was because of her Jamaican nationality and
that the treatment meted out to her was less favourable
than treatment reserved for nationals of other States. 93
A. The Undisputed Story – The Denial of Entry, Detention and
Deportation of Shanique Myrie
The facts of Ms. Myrie’s case are extensive. These facts bear
review here because their iteration humanizes the right to freedom of
movement. Above all, this extraordinary set of events undergone by
an ordinary human being highlights the urgency of establishing the
parameters of free movement rights. In repeating the details of her
case, we are reminded that legal rights involve human stories and that
the guarding of those rights guards our very humanity. Unfortunately,
the horrendous experiences of a young woman on her first trip
overseas illuminated the pressing need to close the implementation gap
for hassle-free travel under the RTC.
On Monday, March 24, 2011, Shanique Myrie, a then twentytwo-year-old Jamaican woman, landed in Barbados on a scattered
clouded day.94 At 4:30 p.m., Ms. Myrie disembarked from an inbound
Caribbean Airlines flight that had originated in Jamaica. Three minutes
later she had arrived in the Arrivals Hall at GAIA. Ms. Myrie then
proceeded to Booth 12 where she handed Officer Alicia Young her
Jamaican passport. Officer Young questioned Ms. Myrie about the
circumstances and purposes of her visit. Ms. Myrie “answered that this
was her first visit to Barbados, that she had come for a short vacation
of two weeks, that she had US$300.00 cash with her, and that she
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 3.
Id. at ¶ 14. For the weather report, see Past Weather in Bridgetown, Barbados
—
March
2011,
timeanddate.com,
https://www.timeanddate.com/weather/barbados/bridgetown/historic?month=3
&year=2011.
93
94
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would be staying with Ms. Pamela Clarke, whom she had met ‘through
the internet’”.95
Apparently, the fact that Ms. Myrie met her intended host
through the internet compelled Officer Young to submit Ms. Myrie to
a second inspection.96 At 4:38 p.m., Officer Young took Ms. Myrie to
a waiting room across from the main entrance to the “Secure
Immigration Area (“SIA”).”97 Officer Young then entered the SIA to
go to the office of Mr. Merlo Reid, her supervisor. She “handed him
Ms. Myrie’s passport and Immigration Arrival Form with the request
that he personally interview Ms. Myrie.”98
While Ms. Myrie waited, Officer Young returned to her station,
but Mr. Reid did not immediately interview Ms. Myrie.99 Before Mr.
Reid spoke to Ms. Myrie, Police Officer Everton Gittens, who was
dressed in plain clothes, told Mr. Reid he wanted to interview Ms.
Myrie after Mr. Reid completed the second inspection.100 During Ms.
Myrie’s second inspection, Ms. Myrie provided Mr. Reid with the same
responses that she had given Officer Young. She also gave him Ms.
Clarke’s phone number. After this interview, Mr. Reid “found no cause
to deny her entry into Barbados”101 and stamped Ms. Myrie’s passport
to grant her a thirty-day stay.102 Ms. Myrie momentarily returned to the
waiting room.103 Mr. Reid returned to his office after informing Officer
Gittens that Myrie’s inspection was completed.
Around 5:11 p.m., Officer Gittens, accompanied by a
clothed policewoman, Officer Sirphene Carrington, took Ms.
upstairs from the SIA to the Drugs Squad Office of the
Barbados Police Force (“DSO”).104 The officers then

plainMyrie
Royal
began

Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 16.
Id.
97
Id. at ¶¶ 14, 16.
98
Id. at ¶ 16.
99
Id. at ¶ 17.
100
Id. at ¶¶ 14, 16.
101
Id. at ¶ 17.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at ¶ 18. The Court estimated this time by noting Officer Gittens and
Carrington’s absence from video footage in the SIA and Arrivals Hall of GAIA.
95
96
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interviewing Ms. Myrie “to ascertain whether she was a possible drug
courier.”105 About twenty minutes later, at 5:33 p.m., the officers
escorted Ms. Myrie to the Luggage Hall for her suitcase and then to
the Customs Area for examination by Customs Officers. At the
Customs Examination desk, Ms. Myrie’s possessions were searched
from 5:35 to 5:43 p.m.106
During this time, Officer Gittens twice left the Customs Area
to enter the Public Arrivals Area.107 Using the number that Ms. Myrie
provided, Officer Gittens called Ms. Pamela Clarke by cell phone.108
He identified himself to Ms. Clarke as a police officer in the Drugs
Squad. He then informed Ms. Clarke of the Drug Squad’s interview
with Ms. Myrie and asked Ms. Clarke if she knew Ms. Myrie. Ms. Clarke
denied knowing Ms. Myrie and explained that she was helping her
friend, Daniel Forde, and that Mr. Forde was at the airport to meet
Ms. Myrie.109 Prompted by Officer Gittens, Ms. Clarke described Mr.
Forde’s clothing.110 Officer Gittens then left the Customs Area to
locate Mr. Forde. Initially, he could not find Mr. Forde. Officer Gittens
then returned to the Customs Area and called Ms. Clarke once again
to verify her description.111 Officer Gittens then went outside once
more to the Public Arrivals area and called out the name “Daniel
Forde.”112 Mr. Forde approached Officer Gittens and confirmed that
he was there to give a ride to Ms. Myrie.113
After this brief conversation, Officer Gittens went back to the
Customs Area. Around 5:45 p.m., once the Customs Officer found
nothing illegal in Ms. Myrie’s luggage, Officers Gittens and Carrington
then took Ms. Myrie back to the SIA waiting area. 114 Afterwards,
Officer Gittens told Mr. Reid that he had interviewed Ms. Myrie and
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 18.
Id. at ¶ 14.
107
Id.
108
Id. at ¶ 19.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. (Mr. Forde also explained that Ms. Clarke was unable to come to the
airport because she had injured her hip.)
114
Id. at ¶¶ 14, 20.
105
106
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concluded that she was not truthful about visiting Ms. Clarke and that
Ms. Myrie intended to stay with Mr. Forde.115 Mr. Reid called Ms.
Clarke and asked her if she regularly cleared people at the airport. Ms.
Clarke replied that it was her first time doing so and that “she was
doing a favour [sic] for a friend” and she then expressed regret for her
actions.116
Following this conversation, Officer Gittens departed, and Mr.
Reid retrieved Ms. Myrie from the waiting area and brought her to his
office.117 There, Mr. Reid explained to Ms. Myrie that she would be
denied entry to Barbados. He placed a cancellation stamp on her
passport and signed it.118 In Barbados’s “register of persons refused
entry”, the reason for Ms. Myrie’s denial of entry was listed as
“[i]mproper representation.”119 The official explanation for the denial
stated that Ms. Clarke “was fronting” for Mr. Forde.120 Mr. Reid then
requested that an Immigration Officer, Saritta Chadderton, take Ms.
Myrie and another detained female passenger, Ms. Rickreisha “Susan”
Rowe, to the Customs Area for another search of her luggage. 121
Subsequent to this final search, Ms. Myrie and Ms. Rowe were
led to a detention cell in the SIA. The cell was small, cold, and
windowless. It consisted of one narrow bed, a toilet and sink. Both
women were detained for the night in these austere accommodations.
Neither detainee was allowed to take her luggage or cell phone into the

Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 21.
Id.
117
Id. at ¶ 22.
118
Id.
119
Id. at ¶ 23.
120
Id.
121
Id. at ¶ 22. Ms. Rowe was in detention when Ms. Myrie arrived. Later she
testified about Ms. Myrie’s demeanor in detention. She observed that Ms. Myrie was
crying when she was taken to the detention room. She also said that Ms. Myrie shared
the details of her strip search. Ms. Rowe was being deported for overstaying her
visitor’s permit. While she also had to suffer the deplorable conditions of the
detention room, Ms. Rowe was not otherwise mistreated. Staff Editor, Shanique Myrie
Stands by Finger-Rape Story, Says Bajans Lying -Other Woman Testifies About Squalid
Conditions,
STARBROEK
NEWS
(Mar.
27,
2011),
https://www.stabroeknews.com/2011/03/27/news/guyana/shanique-myriestands-by-finger-rape-story-says-bajans-lying/.
115
116
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cell. In the morning, they recovered their luggage and were taken to
their flight accompanied by three female immigration officers in a
manner that made it clear to “onlookers that they were being
deported.”122
B. Ms. Myrie’s Own Story
As noted above, Ms. Myrie testified that she was taken twice
to the DSO by two people fitting the description of Officers Gittens
and Carrington.123 She stated that Officer Gittens questioned her
aggressively and told her that he suspected she was bringing drugs into
Barbados. She told Officer Gittens that her bags had been searched to
establish that she had not been carrying any drugs.124 The officers then
carried her suitcase upstairs and searched it again.125 They opened the
suitcase bottom and asked about some food items that she had
packed.126 Officer Gittens also took her slippers from the suitcase, cut
them in half, sniffed them for drugs and threw them back in her
suitcase.127
The officers questioned Ms. Myrie about Ms. Clarke and Mr.
Forde.128 After Officer Gittens spoke to Ms. Clarke, he told Ms. Myrie
that “Daniel” was waiting for her and that he knew her name and
described her clothing.129 Ms. Myrie denied knowing Daniel Forde.130
When Officer Gittens questioned how Mr. Forde knew these details
about her, Ms. Myrie said Ms. Clarke must have told him. 131 During
this questioning, Ms. Myrie was frequently accused of lying and
claimed that Officer Carrington “repeatedly uttered slurs and
expletives like ‘I hate these f------ Jamaicans,’ ‘You Jamaicans are all

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 24.
Id. at ¶ 28.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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liars’ or ‘they only come here to steal our men and carry drugs into our
country.’”132
Officer Gittens told Ms. Myrie that they planned to transport
her to the hospital for a body search and made a call to make those
arrangements.133 However, after a conversation between the two
officers, the female officer, Officer Carrington, took Ms. Myrie to a
bathroom across the hall from the DSO.134 Officer Carrington then
locked the bathroom door and told Ms. Myrie to take off her clothes.135
When Ms. Myrie asked why she needed to disrobe, Officer Carrington
threatened to imprison her if she did not comply with the request.136
Reluctantly, Ms. Myrie complied with the request. Officer Carrington
put on a pair of gloves and conducted a painful, humiliating body
cavity search on Ms. Myrie. As a result of this search, Ms. Myrie
testified that “she cried and felt ashamed, dirty and angry” and “she
felt she had been treated like a criminal.”137
When Ms. Myrie returned to the DSO with Officer Carrington,
Officer Gittens had Ms. Myrie’s passport in hand and told her he was
going to have her stamped entry cancelled if she did not tell the truth
about what she was carrying for Mr. Forde and who Mr. Forde was.138
Ms. Myrie repeated to Officer Gittens that she did not know Mr.
Forde. After she confirmed she was “sticking to that story,” Officer
Carrington told her “You are a liar, I don’t like you f------ Jamaicans,
you are all liars, you think you’re going to come here and f--- up my
country, it’s not going to happen.”139
During her questioning, Ms. Myrie “was refused permission to
make a phone call to her family in Jamaica” and was denied the
opportunity to contact the Jamaican embassy.140 Officer Gittens told
her that she would be released if she told the truth and Ms. Myrie
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 28.(quoting Ms. Myrie’s testimony).
Id. at ¶ 29.
Id. at ¶¶ 29, 30.
Id. at ¶ 30.
Id.
Id. (quoting Ms. Myrie’s testimony).
Id.
Id. (quoting Ms. Myrie’s testimony).
Id. at ¶ 31.
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reiterated that she had been telling the truth.141 After her questioning
ended, Ms. Myrie never saw the two police officers again.142
Ms. Myrie also provided testimony about the physical
condition of the detention cell at GAIA. The floors of the cell and
bathroom were muddy.143 The walls of the cell were covered with
brown marks that resembled feces. The room was littered with spoiled
toilet paper and smelled of feces.144
C. Barbados’s Summation of the Ms. Myrie’s Ordeal
Barbados’s version of Ms. Myrie’s ordeal emphatically disputed
her testimony. Both Officers Gittens and Carrington gave signed
statements for an internal police investigation and testified in Court.145
In their testimony, the officers stated a number of facts that were
clearly contrary to Ms. Myrie’s version of events. First, the officers
indicated that Ms. Myrie was continuously supervised. They also stated
that Ms. Myrie was not suspected of, not questioned about, and never
told that she was suspected of transporting drugs. The officers further
testified that Ms. Myrie was only questioned to determine whether she
was carrying drugs. The officers likewise denied that Ms. Myrie’s
luggage was searched, her slippers were cut, and her cell phone was
examined. Finally, they similarly disavowed that they had insulted Ms.
Myrie for being Jamaican and that they subjected her to a cavity
search.146 Thus, Barbados’s account of Ms. Myrie’s ordeal was devoid
of undue suspicion and mistreatment on its part.
Accordingly, Barbados denied Ms. Myrie’s factual allegations
as a basis for denying her claim. In its denial, “Barbados accept[ed] that
Ms. Myrie was refused entry, detained overnight and deported the
morning after her arrival[,]” but denied many of her other factual
allegations. Specifically, based on the officers’ statements, Barbados
denied that Ms. Myrie was subjected to a body cavity search or was
141
142
143
144
145
146

Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 31.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 26.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 32.
Id.
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treated improperly, badly or unfavorably. Further, Barbados refuted
her assertion that she was refused entry due to her nationality and
claimed that Barbados’s denial of entry resulted from Ms. Myrie not
being truthful in her statements to immigration officers in Barbados.147
D. The Court’s Determination of the Facts
The Court found most of the facts given by Ms. Myrie to be
credible.148 The Court also noted that after being deported back to
Jamaica, Ms. Myrie called her friend, Julian Jackson, who had driven
her to the airport on the day before.149 When she met him at the airport
upon her return, she started crying and told Mr. Jackson about her
treatment in Barbados including the slurs about being Jamaican, calling
her a liar, accusing her of carrying drugs and subjecting her to a body
cavity search.150 Mr. Jackson immediately drove Ms. Myrie to “the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade where she made an oral
report to the officials who advised her to put her complaint in
writing.”151 She followed this advice and submitted a report that
conformed to her testimony in Court. In response, the Jamaican
Government sent a delegation to Barbados in an effort to investigate
the incident.152
In addition, the Court remarked that two doctors testified to
the Court about Ms. Myrie enduring psychological and emotional
injuries as a result of the incident in Barbados. A medical doctor
concluded that Ms. Myrie suffered from “mild post-traumatic stress
syndrome” and that this condition arose out of her experience in
Barbados.153 Further, a forensic psychiatrist testified that, based on his

“This refusal was, in the view of Barbados, justified because its
Immigration Act requires foreigners to answer the questions of immigration officers
truthfully. Barbados also submits that Ms. Myrie was told that this was the reason for
refusing her entry and that her detention overnight was in accordance with the laws
of Barbados.” Myrie, supra note 1, ¶ 5.
148
Id. at ¶ 33.
149
Id. at ¶ 34.
150
Id.
151
Id. at ¶ 34.
152
Id.
153
Id. at ¶ 35.
147
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examination of Ms. Myrie, she “was still suffering from mental or
emotional injuries and would continue to do so for some time.”154
However, given the differences in testimony concerning
whether Myrie underwent a body cavity search and was subjected to
slurs during her questioning, the Court had to ascertain the evidence
establishing or disproving these events. Although Barbados denied
that Officer Carrington conducted a body cavity search, the Court
found that Ms. Myrie’s accurate recall of the bathroom and the small
Drug Squad office bolstered the credibility of her story. Moreover, Ms.
Myrie provided identifying details that helped the Court establish that
the officers involved were in fact Officers Gittens and Carrington.155
Furthermore, the Court found that the reports of the two officers
lacked credibility because they were virtually identical given that the
two officers collaborated on their recollection of the events.
Specifically, the Court remarked that it was unlikely that two Drug
Squad Officers did not tell Ms. Myrie that they suspected her of being
a drug courier or that they did not search her for drugs. 156
E. Ms. Myrie’s Locus Standi
Before hearing Ms. Myrie’s claims, the Court was first required
to establish its original jurisdiction over her case.157 Consequently, after
granting leave to establish its jurisdiction, the Court held its first Special
Leave hearing, on April 18, 2012, for submissions concerning its
jurisdiction in the case.158 This hearing was historic in that it served to
establish the right of a CARICOM national to bring suit in the Court

Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 36.
Id. at ¶¶ 36–9.
156
Id. at ¶¶ 40-41.
157
Article 211 of the RTC gives the CCJ “compulsory and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes concerning the interpretation and
application of the Treaty, including . . . applications by persons in accordance with
Article 222, concerning the interpretation and application of this Treaty.” RTC, supra
note 13, Art. 211.
158
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 7.
154
155
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for infringement of the right to freedom of movement under the
RTC.159
To resolve this issue, the Court examined the five requirements
of Article 222 of the RTC concerning locus standi of private entities. To
establish locus standi, the Court must determine whether: (1) the
individual bringing suit is a “Person[], natural or juridical, of a
Contracting Party”;160 (2) that individual directly benefits from a right
under the RTC; (3) that individual’s enjoyment of that RTC right has
been prejudiced; (4) the Contracting Party has not brought the claim
or has agreed to let the affected individual bring the claim; and (5) the
interest of justice requires that the affected individual be allowed to
bring the claim.161
In establishing its jurisdiction, the Court found that Ms. Myrie
met all of these requirements. It opined that as a Jamaican national,
Ms. Myrie was a “Person of a Contracting Party” and that she had an
“arguable” right under the RTC from which she directly benefited and
her enjoyment of that right had been prejudiced.162 The Court also
noted that Jamaica had permitted Ms. Myrie to bring the case and that
the interest of justice required granting Ms. Myrie permission to pursue
her claim.163
F. Ms. Myrie’s Right to Freedom of Movement
Ms. Myrie presented two claims based on her nationality. The
first was her right to be free from discrimination based on her
nationality. In this claim, Ms. Myrie alleged that Barbados had violated
“her rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the RTC to non-discrimination
on the ground of nationality only and to treatment that is no less
favourable than that accorded to nationals of other CARICOM States
159
Salvatore Caserta & Mikael Rask Madsen, Between Community Law and
Common Law: The Rise of the Caribbean Court of Justice at the Intersection of Regional Integration
and Post-Colonial Legacies, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS 89, 111 (2016).
160
“Contracting Party” is defined as a party to the RTC. RTC, supra note 13,
art. 1.
161
Id. at art. 222.
162
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 7.
163
Id. As noted above, Jamaica later became an intervener is this case. In
addition, CARICOM was also represented in this case.
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or third States.”164 Her second claim raised the issue of freedom of
movement. She based her claim to the right to freedom of movement
on Article 45 of the RTC as implemented by “a Decision of the
Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community
taken at their Twenty-Eighth Meeting (‘the 2007 Conference
Decision’).”165
Barbados tested Ms. Myrie’s second claim by asserting in effect
that there was an implementation gap in the establishment of the right
of freedom of movement under Article 45 of the RTC.166 Hence,
Barbados challenged the legal basis for Ms. Myrie’s assertion of her
right of freedom of movement under the RTC for four reasons. 167 First,
Barbados argued that the 2007 Conference Decision did not create any
legally binding rights because it was an agreement and not a decision
within the meaning of Article 28(1) of the RTC.168 Second, due to a
reservation by Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados opined that the
Decision lacked the required unanimity under Article 28 (1) and further
that the Decision had “not been subjected to Barbados’[s]
constitutional procedures as required under Article 240(1) of the
RTC.”169 Third, Barbados asserted that if the 2007 Conference
Decision did create a right of freedom of movement for individuals,
that constructed right and related allegations of wrongful treatment by
Barbados border officials are not subject to judicial review under the
RTC because the exercise of immigration and customs procedures
constitute “activities” that in accordance with Article 30 of the RTC
are excluded from the free movement rights under the RTC.170 Fourth,
Barbados claimed that any right of entry created for Community
nations is not an absolute or unrestricted right because the 2007
Conference Decisions recognized “the rights of Member States to

164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 3.
Id. at ¶ 4.
Id. at ¶ 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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refuse undesirable persons entry and to prevent persons from
becoming a charge on public funds.”171
With its last two arguments, Barbados challenged Ms. Myrie’s
allegations of discrimination due to her nationality. In that regard,
Barbados argued that its officers did not discriminate against Ms. Myrie
based on her nationality or otherwise and consequently there was no
violation of the non-discrimination provision in Article 7 of the RTC.
Barbados also claimed that Ms. Myrie was not treated less favorably
than nationals of other states and therefore, there was no violation of
the most favored nation treatment as required by Article 8 of the
RTC.172
G. The Court’s Response – Filling the Implementation Gap for
Hassle-Free Travel
Filling the implementation gap involved a two-step process for
the Court. The Court first reviewed the applicable Community law to
determine whether there was binding law implementing freedom of
movement in CARICOM. After making that determination, the Court
needed to explore the impact of Community law on domestic law in
Barbados in the absence of domestic legislation implementing
Community law in Barbados. As discussed below, it is the second step
that is of particular significance in common law nations that espouse
dualism in applying international law.
The freedom of movement question in Ms. Myrie’s case was
based on Article 45 of the RTC and the 2007 Conference Decision,
both of which were critical to the Court’s determination and bear
repeating here before reviewing the key portions of the Court’s
decision.
Article 45 of the RTC states: “Member States commit
themselves to the goal of free movement of their nationals within the
Community.”

171
172

Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 6.(quoting the 2007 Conference Decision).
Id. at ¶ 7.
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As reproduced in the Court’s opinion, the 2007 Conference
Decision provides:
THE CONFERENCE
AGREED that all CARICOM nationals should be
entitled to an automatic stay of six months upon arrival
in order to enhance their sense that they belong to, and
can move in the Caribbean Community, subject to the
rights of Member States to refuse undesirable persons
entry and to prevent persons from becoming a charge
on public funds.
NOTED the reservation entered by Antigua and
Barbuda in this regard173
The question raised by these two provisions is whether the
arguably aspirational language of Article 45 of the RTC was
implemented by a unanimous decision of the Heads of Government
as required by Article 28(1) of the RTC. To determine that question,
the Court needed to address the legal significance of the 2007
Conference Decision in creating binding Community law
notwithstanding the reservation by Antigua and Barbuda.
1. The Relationship Between Community and Domestic Law
Under the RTC
In its discussion of the applicable law, the CCJ began by
distinguishing the impact of the applicable community and domestic
law on this case.174 Although the Court indicated that the Immigration
Act and Administrative Acts of Barbados are applicable to the facts,
the Court would first need to determine whether “Community law”
also applied to the case.175 Given that the Court has the authority to
interpret the RTC, the Court’s first determination required it to
determine whether Article 45 of the RTC had been implemented. At
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 43.
Id.
175
Id. The Court determined that “Community law” would include for this
decision, the RTC and the 2007 Conference Decision.
173
174
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the heart of this discussion was the distinction between the creation of
binding law at the municipal level and the creation of “binding rights
and obligations at the Community level.”176 Accordingly, as International
Court of Justice Judge Patrick Robinson explained
The dualist dichotomous approach to international
law, resulting in the possibility that in a dualist country
a treaty may not be enforceable in its courts, but at the
international level that country may be in breach of the
treaty, quite often creates difficulties and a kind of legal
paradox; nonetheless that paradox and dichotomy
remain an essential part of the constitutional system of
dualist countries.177
Turning to Community law, the Court’s first discussion
focused on the binding nature of the 2007 Conference Decision. As
noted above, Barbados raised two key points concerning this decision.
First, Barbados argued that since the wording of the 2007 Conference
Decision used the word “agreed” and not “decided”, this statement
was not a binding decision within the meaning of Article 28(1) of the
RTC.178 Further, Barbados contended that the reservation by Antigua
and Barbuda meant that the 2007 Conference Decision was not “an
affirmative vote of all its members” within the meaning of Article
28(1).
The Court succinctly dispensed of these two arguments. First,
it noted that other CARICOM documents consistently referenced the
2007 Conference Decision as a decision.179 Thus, it concluded that: “it
is of no consequence that the 2007 Conference Decision uses the word
‘agreed’ and not ‘decided’”.180 Second, it explained that the reservation
did not detract from the unanimity of the decision for three reasons:
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 51.
Patrick Robinson, The Myrie Judgement: Community Law vs National Law,
JAMAICA
OBSERVER
(Oct.
16,
2013),
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/The-Myrie-judgement--Community--law-vs-national-law---p---_15253513.
178
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 6.
179
Id. at ¶ 45.
180
Id.
176
177

569

2020

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

8:2

(1) a reservation was not equivalent to a veto and was therefore not a
negative vote; (2) Antigua and Barbuda could have intervened in the
case, if those nations had intended that their reservations rendered the
2007 Conference Decision to be nonbinding; and (3) “the Conference,
the CARICOM Secretariat and the various Organs of the Community
have all regarded and treated the 2007 Conference Decision as valid
and binding.”181
Next, the Court addressed the impact of Community law on
domestic law in Barbados. The court noted that nations “with a dualist
approach to international law” are typically required to enact municipal
law to transform treaty law into enforceable domestic law. 182 This
process is reflected in Article 240 of the RTC which provides that “the
relevant constitutional procedures of the Member States” determine
the creation of “legally binding rights and obligations for nationals of
such states.”183
The Court indicated that in the absence of Community law,
Barbados would have the right under its Immigration Act to restrict
the entry of “persons who are not citizens or permanent residents of
Barbados.”184 The Court further noted that
The RTC, however, and more particularly the 2007
Conference Decision brought about a fundamental
change in the legal landscape of immigration
throughout the Community. In contradistinction to
foreigners in general, Community nationals now do
have a right to enter the territory of Barbados and that
of other Member States unless they qualify for refusal
under the two exceptions mentioned above.185
After making this statement on the supremacy of Community
law, the Court applied the concept of dualism to its discussion on the
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 47.
Id. at ¶ 51.
183
RTC, supra note 13, art. 240.
184
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 50.
185
Id. As noted in the 2007 Conference Decision, the two exceptions are
undesirable persons and persons who may become a charge on public funds.
181
182
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impact of domestic law on freedom of movement in CARICOM. The
Court stated:
Although it is evident that a State with a dualist
approach to international law sometimes may need to
incorporate decisions taken under a treaty and thus
enact them into municipal law in order to make them
enforceable at the domestic level, it is inconceivable
that such a transformation would be necessary in order
to create binding rights and obligations at the
Community level.186
The Court then explained the inapplicability of the Saving
provision in Article 240 of the RTC requiring that Community law be
“subject[ed] to the relevant constitutional procedures of the Member
States before creating legally binding rights and obligations for
nationals of such States.”187 The Court also clarified that Article 240
did not impact Community law, but instead dealt with enacting
domestic laws that will “enable Community nationals to enforce their
rights at the national level and in the municipal courts.” 188 The Court
reasoned that invalidating Community law due to the failure of a
CARICOM Member State to implement conforming domestic law
would essentially return CARICOM to “the pre-2001 voluntary
system” of regional integration.189 The Court also observed that: “It is
the obligation of each State, having consented to the creation of a
Community obligation, to ensure that its domestic law, at least in its
application, reflects and supports Community law.”190 Moreover, the
Court maintained that requiring the incorporation of Community law
into domestic law in order to make that Community law enforceable
at the regional level leads to an absurdity of logic and “would destroy
the uniformity, certainty and predictability of Community law” if some
Member States failed to enact the appropriate legislation.191

186
187
188
189
190
191

Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 51.
RTC, supra note 13, art. 240.
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 52.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 53.
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Thus, the Court explained that the Member States are not
required to enact legislation to create Community law, but only to give
“domestic effect” to binding decisions that create Community law. 192
Further, the Court expounded that legislation is not required to give
domestic effect where Constitutional provisions or existing legislation
sanction the use of executive or judicial actions to grant domestic
effect to such decisions.193 Accordingly, “in the absence of any
indication to the contrary a valid decision of a Community Organ or
Body taken in fulfilment or furtherance of the RTC or to achieve the
objectives of the Community is immediately binding at the Community
level.”194 The Court expanded on this remark by indicating that such
decisions should include a time frame for implementation, but that
without those time frames, Member States still have an obligation
under Article 240(2) to “act expeditiously” to implement decisions of
a Community Organ or Body.195
To limit the application of Article 45, Barbados also argued
that the activities of its immigration and customs officials are not
subject to judicial review by the Court according to Article 30 of the
RTC.196 Barbados asserted that, under Article 30(2), the activities of
these officials were excluded from the operation of Chapter Three of
the RTC which includes Article 45 on free movement of Nationals.
According to Barbados, these activities concerned “the exercise of
governmental authority” because they formed “part of a system of
national security” or involved “the establishment or maintenance of
public order.”197 The Court set aside these arguments stating:
The purpose of Article 30 is to allow Member States as
part of the exercise of their sovereignty to reserve
certain public service positions strictly for their own
nationals. . . . It is, however, not intended to limit the
right to free movement as such nor can it be invoked
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 54.
Id.
194
Id. at ¶ 55 (citing Hummingbird Rice Mills Limited v Suriname and the Caribbean
Community [2012] CCJ 1 (OJ)).
195
RTC, supra note 13, art. 240; Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 55.
196
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 56.
197
RTC, supra note 13, art. 30(2); Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 56.
192
193
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to prevent the Court from subjecting to judicial
scrutiny the actions of functionaries in those areas in
the exercise of their duties in the context of the RTC.198
2. Unrestricted Right of Entry Under Articles 45 and 46 of the
RTC
Following its discussion of judicial review, the Court addressed
Barbados’s arguments that Ms. Myrie had a restricted right of entry
under the RTC and that Barbados was justified in refusing her entry.
The Court disagreed with this argument and stated “[a]lthough Article
45 RTC embodies that concept in aspirational terms, the right [to free
movement of Nationals] has to a great extent already been enshrined
and fleshed out in the RTC itself.”199 To address this issue, the Court
examined the provisions of Article 46 of the RTC on the “Movement
of Skilled Community Nationals.” This RTC article was “undertake[n]
as a first step towards achieving the goal set out in Article 45.”200 To
reach that goal, Article 46(2) requires that “Member States . . . establish
appropriate legislative, administrative and procedural arrangements to
. . . provide for movement of Community nationals into and within
their jurisdictions without harassment or the imposition of
impediments.”201 Rejecting Barbados’s arguments the Court declared:
From Article 46(3) RTC it can be deduced that the
concept of free movement entails the right of
Community nationals to have unrestricted access to,
and movement within, the jurisdictions of the Member
States “subject to such conditions as the public interest
may require.” The fourth paragraph of Article 46 RTC
charges the Conference, inter alia, with the duty “to
enlarge, as appropriate, the classes of persons entitled
to move and work freely in the Community.”202

198
199
200
201
202

Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 56.
Id. ¶ 58.
RTC, supra note 13, art. 46(1); Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 59.
RTC, supra note 13, art. 46(2); Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 59.
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 59.
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Along these lines, the Court’s discussion of freedom of
movement went beyond the objections raised by Barbados. To bolster
its opinion, the Court also addressed the need for unrestricted travel
in order for CARICOM Nationals to provide the services envisioned
in the CSME. The Court explained that in certain approved service
sectors under the RTC, Community Nationals should not only have
the right to unrestricted permission to enter other Members States for
business purposes, but Nationals should also have a corollary right to
enter other Members States to receive those services “without being
obstructed by unreasonable restrictions.”203 In the Court’s view, free
movement of persons is critical to the provision and use of services by
Community Nationals.
3. The 2007 Conference Decision and Freedom of Movement
under the RTC
The Court next explored the implications of the 2007
Conference Decision on freedom of movement under the RTC. The
Court opened by noting that the decision conferred an “automatic
stay” or “definite stay” of up to six months for Nationals upon entry
into a Member State.204 Noting the historical importance of hassle-free
travel, the Court acknowledged that “the full extent of the right is that
both entry and stay of a Community national in another Member State
must not only be ‘definite’ but also ‘hassle[-]free’ or ‘without
harassment or the imposition of impediments’”.205
The Court further studied the impact of the stated exceptions
to this right – undesirability and potential to become a charge on public
funds—on the right of a definite stay. While Barbados contended that
the determination of these exceptions was a condition precedent to the
right of entry, the Court disagreed stating “[t]he wording of the
Decision where it speaks about ‘automatic stay’ or ‘definite entry’ upon
arrival, suggests that the right does not depend on discretionary

203
204
205

Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 61.
Id. at ¶ 62.
Id. at ¶ 63.
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evaluations of immigration officers or other authorities at the port of
entry.”206
The Court explained that this conclusion is based upon the
integration of the 2007 Conference Decision with the RTC’s freedom
of movement provisions. Hence, the RTC’s security and general
exceptions in Articles 225 and 226 allows Member States to
“justifiably” restrict or curtail the right of entry under the RTC as
implemented by the 2007 Conference Decision. However, these
permissible limitations in the RTC and the 2007 Conference Decision
“must equally be construed as exceptions to, and restrictions on, the
right of Community nationals from other Member States to enter into
and move around the receiving State ‘without harassment or the
imposition of impediments.’”207
To understand the effects of the exceptions to and restrictions
on freedom of movement in CARICOM, the Court referenced Article
48 of the EEC Treaty208 and a European Court of Justice case.209 Based
on this authority, the Court concluded that the exceptions should not
be considered a condition precedent to the right of entry, but a
restriction imposed with sufficient evidence of the applicability of the
exception.210 To illustrate these points, the Court turned to the
exceptions in the 2007 Conference Decision for undesirable persons
or persons who may become a charge on public funds and stated that
there were two consequences of applying these exceptions. First, the
scope of each exception to the “fundamental principle of freedom of
movement” and its corresponding rationale “must be interpreted
narrowly and strictly in order to avoid an unjustified watering down of
the importance” of the rights constrained by the exceptions.211 Second,
“being an exception to this fundamental principle, the burden of proof
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 64.
Id. at ¶ 65.
208
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (1957), 298
U.N.T.S.
11(the
E.E.C.
Treaty),
available
at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20298/v298.pdf.
209
Case 48/75 Royer, 1976 E.C.R. 498, 512, https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61975CJ0048&from=EN.
210
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 66.
211
Id. at ¶ 67.
206
207
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must rest on the Member State that seeks to invoke either ground for
refusing entry.”212 The Court then discussed the procedural
consequences for a refusal of entry.213 In addition to having adequate
grounds for refusal of entry, the Member State who denies entry must
promptly provide the reason for that denial in writing to the affected
Community National.214
Having established the fundamental principles of freedom of
movement, the Court went through the remaining issues in the case
concerning Ms. Myrie’s claim of discrimination based on her
nationality and her claim of a breach of the right to Most Favoured
Nation treatment. Earlier in the decision, the Court had opined that it
had “no jurisdiction to adjudicate violations of international human
rights treaties and conventions” and noted that “[t]hose instruments
generally provide for their own dispute resolution mechanism.”215
However, the Court recognized that as an international court it was
authorized under Article 217 of the RTC to “apply such rules of
international law as may be applicable.” 216 As a result, the Court
concluded that it was able and required to “take into account principles
of international human rights law when seeking to shape and develop
relevant Community law.”217 Ultimately, the Court dismissed the
discrimination claim stating that it was “not possible properly to
discern a pattern of discrimination” based on the “weaknesses in the
statistical material and the insufficiency of the other evidence” to
support this claim.218 For similar reasons, the Court also dismissed Ms.
Myrie’s claim of breach of Most Favoured Nation treatment.219 Despite
the dismissal of the last two claims, the Court ordered Barbados to pay
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Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 67.
Id. at ¶¶ 77-83.
Id. at ¶ 77.
Id. at ¶ 10.
RTC, supra note 13, art. 217; Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 10.
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶ 10.
Id. at ¶ 91.
Id. at ¶ 92.
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Ms. Myrie Bds$2240.00 for pecuniary damages, and Bds$75,000.00 for
non-pecuniary damages.220
IV. CONCLUSION
The choice of the CCJ as the forum for Ms. Myrie’s claim was
critical to the success of her case. If Ms. Myrie had sued in Barbados,
the case would have applied the Barbados immigration law instead of
the RTC.221 By bringing suit in the CCJ to enforce Article 45 of the
RTC on Movement of Community Nationals, Ms. Myrie invoked the
original jurisdiction of the CCJ through the application of the RTC.222
At the same time, the choice of this forum limited Ms. Myrie’s recovery
to Community law.223 Her resort to the CCJ to assert her freedom of
movement rights under the RTC sustained her claims in the CCJ even
though Barbados had not harmonized its domestic laws with
Community law. Thus, Ms. Myrie’s choice of forum determined the
outcome of her case.
This exploration of the historical roots of freedom of
movement and its development in Myrie v. Barbados indicates two
important markers in the establishment of freedom of movement. The
first marker, an attempt to address freedom of movement in the WIF
constitution, failed in part due to the highly sensitive politics involved
in freedom of movement. The second marker, a construction of the
parameters of freedom of movement based on Community law, has
now enhanced the ability of Caribbean Nationals to secure their
freedom of movement rights.

The pecuniary amount equals US $1105.71 and the non-pecuniary
amounts is equal to US $37021.70. Thus, her total damages were US $38127.41.
Myrie, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 95, 100, 101.
221
Id. ¶ 52. See also Patrick Robinson, The Myrie Judgement: Community Law vs
National
Law,
JAMAICA
OBSERVER
(Oct.
16,
2013),
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/The-Myrie-judgement--Community--law-vs-national-law---p---_15253513.
222
RTC, supra note 13, art. 211.
223
More particularly, the Court indicated that it had jurisdiction “to interpret
and apply the RTC and secondary ‘legislation’ emanating from the Treaty.” Myrie,
supra note 1, at ¶ 10.
220
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Notwithstanding this progress, the claimants in three ensuing
cases on freedom of movement brought subsequent to Myrie v.
Barbados did not prevail.224 The failure of these cases was not due to a
change in Community law regarding the right of freedom of
movement. Instead, the cases failed due to lack of evidence to
substantiate a claim of breach of freedom of movement rights.
Nonetheless, Myrie v. Barbados remains a historical watershed in
the development of Community law and the expanding role of the
CCJ. As Justice Winston Anderson of the CCJ noted about Myrie:
It demonstrates the ability of the Court to touch the
lives of the ordinary Caribbean citizen. It contains
important guidance not only on the meaning of the
right to free movement under the RTC but also
provides a glimpse into the jurisprudential philosophy
of the Court when sitting in its original jurisdiction. It
proves that the Court understands its responsibility as
the guardians of the RTC.225
Above all, the Myrie v. Barbados case effects a critical closing of
the implementation gap for hassle-free travel in the Caribbean. The
case clearly elucidates how, with the CCJ’s astute interpretation, the
2007 Conference Decision has transformed Article 45 from an
aspirational goal to an applied fundamental right of freedom of
movement under the RTC.

Tomlinson v. Belize, [2016] CCJ 1 (OJ) (claiming breach of right of
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(attempting to enforce a right to freedom of movement without sufficient
documentation to establish Grenadian citizenship).
225
Winston Anderson, Free Movement Within CARICOM: Deconstructing Myrie
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